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‘Special circumstances’ in child support
departure applications and the very
wealthy
Lisa Young*
Australia’s formula for calculating child support has an inbuilt ‘cap’, the result
of which is that there is a maximum liability for child support in any case. The
legislation also provides a process by which parents can seek a departure
from the normal application of the formula. There are a number of limited
grounds for departure, one of which relates directly to the ‘income, property
and financial resources’ of the parents. A question which has arisen in some
cases is whether the mere fact of a very high income of a parent is sufficient
to establish a ground for departure. All of the grounds for departure require
that the applicant show ‘special circumstances’. Given the formula relies on
income, and has a cap on the costs of children tied to combined parental
income, where a parent is already paying the maximum possible rate of child
support, does the mere fact of a very high parental income (or indeed
extreme wealth) amount to a special circumstance? Different judicial officers
have answered this question differently. This papers considers this question,
the case law and argues that a special circumstance requires something
more; that is, something more than the normal and intended operation of the
formula. Further, the paper identifies flaws in decision making in this area
which influence how the provisions are applied more generally.
Introduction
As in family law more generally, decision makers hearing ‘departure
applications’ – applications to depart from formula based assessment of child
support - have considerable discretion. However, to succeed in an application
under s 117 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) (CSAA), a
party must first show they have a ‘special circumstance’,1 which falls within
one of the ‘grounds’ set out in s 117(2).2 Once any ground is established, then
the decision maker must decide whether it would be just and equitable to the
parents and any eligible children to change the assessment, and if so how,3 and
also consider whether any such change would be proper from the community’s
perspective.4
The most common ground relied upon in departure applications made to the
Department of Human Services Child Support (CS)5 is that relating to the
* Associate Professor in the Murdoch University, School of Law. The author would like to
thank the reviewers and Acting Editor Juliet Behrens for their useful comments; all errors
remain the responsibility of the author.
1 CSAA s 117(1)(a).
2 This section is broken into 10 grounds (or ‘reasons’) in CS documentation.
3 CSAA s 117(1)(b)(ii)(A).
4 CSAA s 117(1)(b)(ii)(B). This provision ensures that taxpayer considerations are taken into
account, by considering the effect of any decision on the parties’ receipt of income tested
government benefits.
5 Formerly known as the Child Support Agency, Child Support is presently a section of the
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financial circumstances of the parents;6namely, that the assessment ‘would
result in an unjust and inequitable’ rate of child support to be paid, because of
the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of either parent
(ss 117(2)(c)(ia) and (ib) – (ib) deals with earning capacity while (ia) covers
the other matters7). Relatively few child support cases reach court8 and so
there is not a great deal of recent superior jurisprudence on the application of
s 117.
This paper discusses a question which has been answered differently by
different decision makers, namely, whether the mere fact that a paying parent
has a very high income or considerable wealth amounts to a ‘special
circumstance’ under s 117, when that parent is already paying the maximum
assessed rate of child support. The reason this particular issue is problematic
is that child support assessments are calculated based on parental income, and
the administrative formula for calculating child support has a built in ‘cap’ on
the costs of children tied to parental income. This means there is an effective
cap on the level of child support arising from the normal application of the
formula. Thus, a legislative decision has been made that, absent any of the
special factors set out in s 117(2), child support is not intended to increase ad
infinitum merely because parental income exceeds the cap combined income,
or the parent has significant assets. However, s 117(2)(c)(ia) provides no
indication of the circumstances in which ‘the income, property and financial
resources of either parent’ will amount to a ‘special circumstance’.
There have been conflicting, and confused, decisions in relation to this
point. However, these cases also highlight some of the interpretive difficulties
arising more generally in the application of s 117. This paper explores
decision making on s 117(2)(c)(ia) and concludes that where the maximum
rate of child support is already being paid, a special circumstance in relation
to income or assets requires more than showing that a party has a very high
income or considerable assets. The paper also argues that these cases highlight
persistent errors by some judicial officers more broadly in the interpretation of
‘special circumstances’ under s 117.
At first blush this may seem overly generous to very wealthy parents, who
could easily afford to make a greater contribution in child support. Even if this
is the case, the correct approach must be determined by the proper
interpretation of the legislation. Further, this paper presents a range of reasons
why permitting departure on this basis is inappropriate within the context of
the legislation as presently drafted, not the least of which is the difficulty of
Federal Department of Human Services. Applications must be made to the department in the
first instance; the initial decision made by the department can be the subject of an internal
merits review (called an ‘objection’ ), then a further merits review by the Social Security
Appeals Tribunal can be sought, and thereafter an appeal on a matter of law can be taken to
court.
6 Child Support Agency, Facts and Figures 08–09, 2009,
<http://www.humanservices.gov.au/corporate/statistical-information-and-data/child-
support/> (accessed 23 April 2015) p 20.
7 Until recently these two subsections were put together in one ‘Reason’ for departure
(Reason 8) in CS’s application for departure form, and so the statistics referred to in n 6 do
not distinguish between applications in relation to the two subsections.
8 Leaving aside financial disincentives to making a court application, as is outlined below, the
court can only hear an application where an issue of law is raised.
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answering the question of how one decides when a parent is rich enough to be
‘special’. That is not to say that there may not be arguments in favour of a
different legislative approach to departures involving the very wealthy;
however, that is another debate.
Further, it is acknowledged that it is not possible in this one paper to address
in depth the myriad of questions that arise out of the application of s 117 and
which are directly or indirectly raised here. Departure applications comprise
an area of law that affects substantial numbers of parents, and yet there is very
little in the way of useful guidance on the application and interrelationship of
the various grounds for departure; certainly this is a topic that would benefit
from greater judicial and academic consideration.
The legislative backdrop — the structure and
operation of s 117
Section 117 authorises the making of an order for child support (and thus a
departure from formula based child support assessment) where:
In the ‘special circumstances of the case’ (s 117(1)(a)) the court is satisfied:
• One or more grounds for departure under s 117(2) exist, and
• That making the order would be:
– Just and equitable as regards the payer, payee and children
(s 117(1)(b)(ii)(A)), and
– Otherwise proper (s 117(1)(b)(ii)(B)).
Section 117(4) sets out eight mandatory considerations,9 in determining
whether it is just and equitable to depart from an assessment.10 Section 117(5)
sets out the considerations relevant to whether a departure would be
‘otherwise proper’, and is designed to require that the impact of any departure
order on a carer parent’s entitlement to income tested government benefits be
considered, in light of the primary nature of the parental duty of support.
In the Full Court decision of Gyselman11 it was held that the application of
s 117 mandates a ‘three step process’12 — establishing a ‘ground’ of departure,
considering whether a change is just and equitable as between payer, payee
and child/ren and then determining whether that change would be ‘otherwise
proper’. Importantly (as this seems to have been overlooked in some cases as
discussed later), the Full Court said that the approach adopted under the
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (FLA) provisions on child maintenance13 reflects
9 These cover the nature of the parental duty to maintain a child, the child’s proper needs, the
financial circumstances of the parents and child, the parents’ commitments to support
themselves and their legal dependants, the costs of providing child care and the question of
hardship.
10 One of those considerations is the ‘proper needs of the child’: s 117(4)(b); CSAA s 117(6)
provides further mandatory considerations relating specifically to the proper needs of the
child.
11 (1992) FLC 92-279; 15 Fam LR 219.
12 Ibid, at [34].
13 Child maintenance under the FLA is however rarely applicable now and even when both
systems were operating together, there was authority to the effect that decision-makers ought
to be influenced by child support formula rates in reaching decisions under the child
maintenance provisions: Beck v Sliwka (1992) 15 Fam LR 520; 107 FLR 289; FLC 92-296.
26 (2015) 29 Australian Journal of Family Law
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the second and third stages of the departure enquiry:14
This suggests that, once the ground of departure has been established, the court, in
the second and third steps, proceeds in a way which is generally consistent with the
Family Law Act provisions. That, however, is subject to the particular wording in
s 117(4)–(9), the general scheme and purpose of the Act and the provisions of s 115
that any departure order is intended to have ‘the effect that the provisions of this Act
relating to the administrative assessment of child support will be departed from in
relation to a child in the special circumstances of the case.15
Subsections 117(4)–(8) are found under the heading ‘Matters to be
considered for the purposes of subparagraph (1)(b)(ii)’ — that is, the second
and third steps in the process. As the second step — the just and equitable
enquiry — is much like the process carried out when considering child
maintenance under the FLA, subs (4) includes considerations similar to the
corresponding FLA provisions. Notably, subs 117(9) states that
‘[s]ubsections (4) to (8) (inclusive) do not limit other matters to which the
court may have regard’. This confirms the broad nature of the enquiry at this
second and third stage. Notably, subs 117(9) is explicit that it does not apply
to the enquiry under s 117(2), namely, whether a ground for departure has
been made out.
Subsection 117(2) states that the grounds for departure ‘are’ those set out in
that section. This indicates that the grounds must be found from within the
subsections of s 117(2). Section 117(2) was interpreted by the Full Court in
Gyselman thus; the ‘approach to the interpretation and application of the
particular grounds . . . must be guided by [the] qualification . . . that . . . the
facts of the case . . . establish something which is special or out of the ordinary
. . . “facts peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from other cases”’.16
So, subss 117(1) and (2) are to be read together to require that a ground for
departure can only be made out when special circumstances exist and those
special circumstances must relate to the specified grounds in s 117(2).
Departure applications therefore include a threshold question that must be
addressed first,17 namely, do the facts of this case give rise to a ‘special
circumstance’, falling within one of the grounds set out in s 117(2), which sets
it apart from the ordinary case? In Gyselman itself, the wife appealed a
significant reduction to a child support assessment, where the trial Judge had
relied on two grounds for departure in combination (high costs of contact and
necessary commitments for self-support) and concluded a ground had been
established because the father did not have enough money to reasonably
support himself once child support was paid. In allowing the appeal, the Full
Court found the trial Judge did not sufficiently analyse the particular facts and
circumstances of the case as they related to s 117, including in relation to
whether a ground for departure was established. It was not sufficient for the
14 Note that s 117(9) has the effect that s 117(4) and (5) are not exhaustive considerations.
15 (1992) 15 Fam LR 219; FLC 92-279 at [37] (emphasis added).
16 Ibid, at [39] (emphasis added).
17 See the Full Court in Gyselman where they note that ‘once the ground of departure has been
established, the Court, in the second and third steps, proceeds in a way which is generally
consistent with the Family Law Act provisions’: (1992) FLC 92-279; 15 Fam LR 219
at [37]. See also the comments at [106] which confirm that subss 117(4) and (5) are not
considered until a ground is established.
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father simply to show he could not afford to pay the assessed rate of child
support — there had to be a special circumstance falling within the grounds
set out in s 117(2) which led to the shortfall in resources.
The operation of the formula ‘cap’
The current iteration of the child support formula was introduced in 2008.
There has been, since the inception of the Child Support Scheme, a ‘cap’ on
the amount of liable parent income used in calculating child support.18
Imposing this limit on income had the effect of capping the rate of child
support payable under the formula. It has long been recognised that this cap
does not limit the amount that can be ordered to be paid pursuant to s 117.19
For example, the maximum rate of child support due on parental income
might be increased in recognition of high private school fees. Once a ground
for departure is established, as noted above, the second stage of the enquiry —
considering what order is just and equitable as between parents and children
— looks more like the process under the FLA for considering child
maintenance, and so there is no limit on the amount of child support that can
be ordered. The assessment of child support is not, at that stage, limited by
how the formula assessment might operate.20
On 1 July 2008 the child support formula underwent radical changes,21
however the notion of a cap on the rate of formula assessed child support was
retained (with little question),22 if in a different form. Under the current
formula,23 child support is calculated by reference to a notional cost for the
relevant child/ren, which is calculated by reference to combined parental
income and the age of the children.24 The cap on the child support rate is now
achieved by putting a cap on the maximum cost of a child, determined by
reference to the child’s age and a maximum relevant combined parental
18 See s 42 of the CSAA when introduced. The way the cap income was calculated changed in
2001 resulting in a lower cap; instead of basing the cap on a multiple of average weekly
earnings of full-time employees, the figure for all employees was adopted, better aligning the
treatment of payer and payee parents. In 2005, just before the legislation was amended to
introduce the new formula, the cap income was $130,767: Commonwealth of Australia, In
the Best Interests of Children — Reforming the Child Support Scheme: Report of the
Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support, May 2005, <https://www.dss.gov.au/our-
responsibilities/families-and-children/publications-articles/in-the-best-interests-of-children-
reforming-the-child-support-scheme-report-of-the-ministerial-taskforce-on-child-support>
(accessed 24 April 2015), p 62.
19 Best and Best [1993] FLC 92-418; (1993) 16 Fam LR 937; 116 FLR 343 at [143].
20 Though as was noted in Beck v Sliwka [1992] FLC 92-296; (1992) 15 Fam LR 520; 107 FLR
289 it may be appropriate for the decision-maker to consider the operation of the formula in
reaching a final decision (for example, where the key issue in dispute was one of the parents’
incomes). For a modern reference to this case, see Styles & Palmer [2014] FamCA 383;
BC201451467 at [360]–[361].
21 Child Support Legislation Amendment (Reform of the Child Support Scheme — New
Formula and Other Measures) Act 2006.
22 Commonwealth of Australia, In the Best Interests of Children: Report, above n 18, at [9.5.5].
23 For a detailed explanation, see L Young, G Monahan, A Sifris and R Carroll, Family Law in
Australia, 8th ed, LexisNexis, Sydney, 2013, at [11.70]ff.
24 This notional cost is then shared between the parties according to their share of combined
income, taking account of the costs they already incur through their physical care of their
child/ren.
28 (2015) 29 Australian Journal of Family Law
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income.25 Thus, under the formula the cost of the child of a particular age
cannot increase above the amount calculated by reference to the cap
(combined parental) income. This figure is $177,073 for 2015;26 the actual
combined parental income will in fact be somewhat higher, as a self-support
amount (presently $23,610)27 is deducted from each parent’s income before
this calculation of combined income is made. When combined parental
income reaches the cap, an individual parent’s liability to pay can increase as
their share of combined parental income increases. However, as there always
remains a cap on total costs of the child/ren, once a parent is liable to pay
100% of the maximum possible costs of the child/ren, they will hit the ‘cap’
liability, and so increases in their income will not further increase their child
support liability. In sum, there is (as there has always been, though calculated
differently) a maximum potential liability for child support built into the
formula. In this regard, it is notable that the Taskforce responsible for the
current formula referred to the ability to exceed the maximum rate assessable
under the formula through the s 117, saying ‘[t]he most likely situation for this
would be to deal with very high private school fees’.28
Departure cases involving very high incomes/wealth
The question that has arisen in a number of cases is whether the mere fact of
extremely high parental income, or mega-wealth, amounts to a ground for
departure under s 117(2)(c)(ia). Before turning to look at this in more detail,
it must be noted that (while on the whole the child support population is not
wealthy)29 there may well be cases where a parent is not paying the maximum
possible rate of child support, but has an extremely high income, or substantial
assets. For example, this may arise where a parent has a low taxable income
but substantial wealth invested in non-income generating assets, or where a
parent has a structure in place that effectively diverts a very high income out
of their hands for tax purposes. Such cases are properly the province of
s 117(2)(c)(ia).30 This paper is concerned, however, with situations where the
formula is operating as it should in relation to the parties’ incomes and results
in the maximum possible assessment of child support by formula but the
receiving parent argues that, because of the paying parent’s extremely high
income or mega-wealth, a special circumstance should be found, thus
permitting an assessment of child support above the maximum rate.31
The relevant section reads as follows:
25 Commonwealth of Australia, In the Best Interests of Children — Reforming the Child
Support Scheme: Summary Report and Recommendations of the Ministerial Taskforce on
Child Support, May 2005, p 7.
26 <http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/enablers/child-support/child-support-
assessment/working-out-child-support-using-the-basic-formula> (accessed 24 March 2015).
27 This can be determined by utilising the child support estimator found on the
department’s website: <http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/themes/child-support-
and-separated-parents> (accessed 23 April 2015).
28 Commonwealth of Australia, above n 18, at [5.4].
29 Child Support Agency, above n 6, at [3.6].
30 CSAA s 117(2)(c)(ib) may also apply, due to the capacity to earn income from an asset.
31 Technically the same argument could be made in relation to a receiving parent’s financial
situation, and the same arguments would apply.
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s 117(2) [T]he grounds for departure are . . .:
(c) that, in the special circumstances of the case, application in relation to the
child of the provisions of this Act relating to administrative assessment of
child support would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the
level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent for the child:
. . .
(ia) because of the income, property and financial resources of either
parent.
There is overlap between some of the subsections of s 117(2) and so the
same facts may be considered under different subsections, in different ways.
Indeed, this was clear in the first case discussed below, Stirling v Dobson.32
While it is beyond the scope of this article to consider the other grounds for
departure in detail, suffice it to say, the above subsection is relied on in cases
of high income/wealth as it is patently the most likely to apply; also this
subsection may well be argued in cases where there is no question of any of
the scenarios raised by the other subsections applying.33 There is no doubt,
however, that a lack of jurisprudence in this area contributes to considerable
uncertainty as to the precise application of the various grounds for departure.
In the 2011 case of Stirling v Dobson, the decision on high income/mega
wealth was obiter, given it was uncontested that there was another ground for
departure open on the basis of agreed private school fees.34 Once that other
ground was established, the second ‘just and equitable’ stage of enquiry
clearly permitted the ultimate decision. However, Ms Stirling argued, amongst
other things, that Mr Dobson’s considerable wealth and capacity to pay
support amounted to a special circumstance. She claimed that actual
expenditure on the children was (and had been during cohabitation) greater
than was allowed for by the formula, that this was due to the wealth of, inter
alia, Mr Dobson and that Mr Dobson could afford to continue to pay child
support far in excess of the formula amount. Mr Dobson offered to pay child
support at the maximum assessed rate ($708/week for the three children), plus
schooling and other nominated costs.
Federal Magistrate Walters was conscious of the ‘cap’, as he began by
stating that Mr Dobson’s income was well over the ‘cap’ of just under
$150,000.35 It was agreed that Mr Dobson could afford, but did not consent to
pay, the rate sought by Ms Stirling. As to the parties’ comparative financial
32 (2011) FLC 98-056; [2011] FMCAfam 52; BC201100158, where there was some discussion
of whether the fact that the children had been supported to a very high standard prior to
separation evidenced a joint intention to ‘care for’ the children in a particular way within the
terms of s 117(2)(b)(ii). This subsection, which also refers to agreements as to the education
of children, is most commonly used to justify departures based on private school tuition fees.
However, this subsection would not invariably apply to all cases of very high incomes/mega
wealth. The precise application of this subsection is also, however, deserving of some more
detailed attention.
33 For example, the parents of the child may have had no prior relationship or financial
interconnection but the payer may be an extremely high earner. This scenario would be
unlikely to enliven any subsection other than s 117(2)(c)(ia).
34 Which would give rise to a special circumstance under s 117(2)(b)(ii).
35 (2011) FLC 98-056; [2011] FMCAfam 52; BC201100158 at [85]. Presumably his Honour
was referring to the combined parental income cap, as there was no individual income cap
at this time.
30 (2015) 29 Australian Journal of Family Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 35 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Thu Apr 30 10:46:45 2015
/journals/journal/ajfl/vol29pt1/part_1
situations, Ms Stirling had no income, but assets in the form of a home worth
$5 million in Australia and a half share in a home worth around $19 million
in the United Kingdom. Mr Dobson’s assets, though hard to value precisely,
were in the order of $30 million and he had an income of just under $9 million
a year. Ms Stirling had subsequently (re)married. Her husband was not
working but had assets and financial resources in the order of $100 million.
Walters FM found that to the extent that Mr Dobson did not meet the
children’s expenses, Mr Stirling would pick up the difference rather than
require Ms Stirling to liquidate her Australian property to support the children.
In relation to the definition of ‘special circumstances’ generally, his Honour
said:
‘special circumstances’ are little more than facts peculiar to a particular case which
distinguish it from other cases, or make it special or out of the ordinary.
Alternatively, facts might amount to ‘special circumstances’ if a failure to take them
into account would result in injustice or undue hardship (to Ms Stirling, or possibly
to the Dobson children).36
However, as held in Gyselman, the special facts must do more than
distinguish a case from others — they must mark it out as special or out of the
ordinary.37 Further, his Honour’s inclusion of a ‘hardship/injustice’ basis for
establishing a special circumstance warrants attention. These words do not
appear either in s 117(2) or in the Full Court’s interpretation of the words
‘special circumstances’ in Gyselman. It is possible this ‘alternative’
formulation is based on a statement made by Ellis J (with whom Nygh and
Mullane JJ agreed) in a child maintenance case under the FLA, Sheahan v
Sheahan.38
It seems a mistaken interpretation of s 117(2), based on Sheahan, has found
its way into first instance child support decision-making. In the earlier child
support case of W & W,39 Riethmuller FM relied on Sheahan, without
explanation, in the same way as Walters FM later did. However, Sheahan
considered child maintenance under the FLA and in particular what amounted
to a special circumstance under what is now s 66K(1)(e) of the FLA (then
s 66E(1)(d)). That section provides a list of factors relevant to determining the
contributions parties ought to make to the support of the relevant children and
includes ‘any special circumstance which, if not taken into account in the
particular case, would result in injustice or undue hardship to any person’.
This FLA section is very different to s 117(2), which sets out the grounds for
departure; moreover, s 117(4)(g) specifically requires the court to look at
hardship in the application of the second stage of the enquiry. That is, under
s 117 hardship is a factor in the second ‘just and equitable’ stage, in deciding
what order, if any, to make — not in deciding whether a special circumstance
is established.
It may be Sheahan was mistakenly relied upon because, in Sheahan, the
Full Court noted they were referred by counsel to the case of Savery — a child
support case dealing with special circumstances under s 117(2). It is
36 Ibid, at [95] (emphasis added).
37 Ibid, at [39].
38 (1993) FLC 92-375; 16 Fam LR 437; 113 FLR 429 at [12].
39 (2005) 34 Fam LR 115; [2005] FMCAfam 295 at [5].
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instructive to consider the relevant passage of Ellis J’s judgment in Sheahan:
There is, understandably, no definition of the phrase ‘special circumstances’
contained in the Act and, in my view, no purpose would be served by attempting to
define it. We have, however, been referred to the decision of Savery and Savery
[1990] FamCA 30; (1990) FLC 92-131 where ‘special circumstances’ were held to
be ‘facts peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from other cases’. The
relevant facts of the particular case must be considered to determine whether they
constitute special circumstances which, in this context, if not taken into account,
would result in injustice or undue hardship to any person.40
Ellis J is therefore only referring to Savery in relation to the general meaning
of the words ‘special circumstance’. As his Honour makes clear, in the context
of the FLA those peculiar facts must ‘result in injustice or undue hardship’ to
someone — because that is what the FLA section requires. Section 117(2) of
the CSAA says no such thing. Thus, Sheahan provides no authority for
importing a test of injustice/hardship into the threshold question of ‘special
circumstances’ under s 117(2). However, it seems this mistaken interpretation
has gained a considerable foothold in first instance decision-making.41
Notably, there appear to be no Full Court decisions that refer to Sheahan in the
same way.
As to the ground for departure in Stirling v Dobson, Walters FM noted that
Ms Stirling did not identify the ground being relied upon in relation to her
claim based on Mr Dobson’s wealth, which no doubt made the task more
difficult for his Honour. As to whether Ms Stirling’s case had substance, his
Honour said:
the question arises whether ‘special circumstances’ might be considered to exist if
Ms Stirling is successful in demonstrating (for example) that the actual cost — to her
— of maintaining the children is indeed something in excess of $1500 or $2000 per
week. If Mr Dobson is ‘only’ contributing some $700 per week to $800 per week
towards the maintenance of the children, and if Mr Dobson is in a much stronger
financial position than Ms Stirling, then might these facts be regarded as sufficient
‘special circumstances’ to support the departure application? In my opinion, they
might. The overall financial circumstances of the parties, and the extremely
comfortable lifestyle enjoyed by the children, clearly set this case apart from other
cases. Where the actual expenses that Ms Stirling incurs in maintaining the children
are far in excess of whatever allowance the child support scheme makes for the costs
of children, and where Mr Dobson has conceded that — if ordered to do so — he
could meet those expenses, it is not diffıcult to conclude that ‘special circumstances’
40 (1993) FLC 92-375; 16 Fam LR 437; 113 FLR 429 at [12] (emphasis added).
41 For examples of other cases that rely on Sheahan in this way, see MNR & MEA [2004]
FMCAfam 619; BC200409215 at [124]; O’ Loughlin & O’ Loughlin (No 2) [2007] FamCA
1546; BC200750780 at [195]; Hartnett & Sampson (No 2) [2007] FamCA 241 at [121];
Robbins & Rosemount [2008] FamCA 486; BC200851297 at [894]; Spencer & Marks (No 2)
[2011] FamCA 932 at [71]; Parkin & Sykes [2011] FMCAfam 842; BC201106239 at [103];
Delacroix & Delacroix [2013] FamCA 1056 at [38]; Wellesley & Weldon [2013] FMCAfam
283; BC201309331 at [98] and Killam & Levitt [2015] FamCA 52 at [74]. Though note the
comments of Wilson FM in Gabbard & Gabbard [2006] FMCAfam 477; BC200611574
at [41]–[43] which seem to challenge, at least partially, this interpretation of Sheahan.
32 (2015) 29 Australian Journal of Family Law
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exist. Further, it is not difficult to conclude that failure to properly consider the
departure application on its merits could result in an injustice to Ms Stirling (if not
to the Dobson children).42
. . . I find that, in the special circumstances of the case now before me, adherence
to the provisions of the child support formula would result in an unjust and
inequitable determination of the level of financial support . . . because of the overall
respective financial positions of the parties (including Mr Stirling’s financial
position).43
The wording of the last paragraph extracted above indicates that his Honour
concluded a ground for departure existed under s 117(2)(c)(ia).44 His Honour
went on to find it just and equitable that Mr Dobson pay 77.5%45 of the
children’s total costs,46 a figure about mid-way between the competing
proposals. The payment included a ‘base’ rate of support (ie, not covering
school expenses) above the maximum amount payable under the formula.
Thus, in reaching his decision, it seems Walters FM concluded that extreme
wealth — including very high parental incomes — is sufficient to establish a
special circumstance.47 His Honour is not alone, if indeed this is his view. In
the 2011 case of Spencer & Marks (No 2),48 Bell J (also relying on the
erroneous interpretation of Sheahan referred to above) is unequivocal on the
point, finding only one ground for departure established, saying of a husband
with an income of $500,000:
It is my belief that the disparate income between the parties is such that the wife
would suffer undue hardship should the order not be departed from, and accordingly
special circumstances are present from the facts of this case justifying a departure
order to minimise the disparity.49
In the 2012 case of Nielson & Nielson,50 while Loughnan J ultimately relied
on high schooling costs as the ‘special circumstance’, his Honour’s
statements51 equally indicate a view that the fact the ‘husband’s income and
earning capacity are many times the cap rate’ was sufficient to establish a
ground for departure.52
42 (2011) FLC 98-056; [2011] FMCAfam 52; BC201100158 at [97] (emphasis added).
43 Ibid, at [175].
44 See also his Honour’s comment, see ibid, at [175].
45 Being half way between what his Honour thought was the appropriate range of 75–80%:
ibid, at [176].
46 Mr Dobson was ultimately ordered to pay $516 per week per child. This was an all-inclusive
rate that included the various out of pocket expenses Mr Dobson had previously been
meeting directly, including school costs.
47 While the claim was in part made in relation to actual expenditure, that alone could not have
been sufficient. The very high expenditure was only possible because of the mega-wealth of
the various parties. Had there been high expenditure on normal living expenses, but no
extreme wealth, there is no question, as his Honour’s reasoning confirms, that the claim
would have failed in this respect. It is not clear what his Honour would have concluded had
the paying parent had a very high income, but never previously expended it on the child/ren
above what was required under the formula assessment (eg, if the parents had not been a
couple previously).
48 [2011] FamCA 932.
49 Ibid at [71].
50 [2012] FamCA 70; BC201250165.
51 Ibid, at [231].
52 See also the decision of Faulks DCJ in Bertram-Power & Power [2013] FamCA 520,
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The Full Court in Best and Best made the following obiter — and otherwise
unexplained — statement, in a decision that confirmed a departure order could
exceed the maximum rate of child support derived utilising the cap:
it is clear to us that [the cap] has no relevance in the determination of a departure
order under s 117. Indeed, one of the circumstances which may attract the exercise
of that power is that the income of the non-custodial parent is (substantially) above
that maximum.53
However, not all judges have adopted the same approach. In Carroll &
Maybury,54 McGuire J rejected a wife’s application for departure that rested
on the husband’s high income.55 While his Honour’s reasoning is somewhat
difficult to follow,56 it is clear that he did not see the mere fact of a very high
income as being sufficient to warrant a change to the assessment.
The matter was considered directly by Strickland J in the 2011 case,
Seymour & Seymour.57 The Federal Magistrate in this case had refused to find
a ground for departure established based solely on the husband’s high income,
relying rather on high education costs, and had then considered the husband’s
substantial income in determining a just and equitable rate of child support.
The Federal Magistrate was explicit that it was the existence of the cap in the
formula that led to this conclusion on the application of s 117(2)(c)(ia).58 On
appeal, Strickland J affirmed the Federal Magistrate’s approach, saying
(somewhat surprisingly) it was consistent with the previous Full Court
authority of Best and Best,59 though his Honour went on to say Best had not
directly addressed the question of whether wealth, without more, could
provide a ground for departure.60
The proper interpretation of s 117(2) and the meaning
of ‘special circumstance’
There is little doubt that the terms of s 117(2)(c)(ia) are open to multiple
possible interpretations. A first port of call for interpreting this section would
therefore require consideration of this subsection in the context of the CSAA.
That is, the fact of the cap needs to be directly addressed when determining
particularly the brief discussion at [8]–[9]. His Honour concluded that the husband’s
substantial income of around $480,000 warranted a departure from the formula assessment,
simply because it was greater by $33,754 than the amount showing in the tax return being
used in the assessment. Notably, as in Stirling, his Honour also indicates that s 117(2)(b)(ii)
— the way the children are being ‘cared for’ — applies because ‘these are privileged
children’ who have been liberally supported by their parents: ibid, at [8].
53 [1993] FLC 92-418; (1993) 16 Fam LR 937; 116 FLR 343 at [143]. It appears in this case
that there was a clear ground available under Reason 8 as the father was earning much more
than the old income figure being used in the assessment which was below the cap.
54 [2013] FCCA 288; BC201309994 at [88]–[90].
55 At least $600,000 per year, which income was able to be distributed to both the husband and
his new wife via a trust.
56 For example, referring to the formula building in ‘the needs’ of the children, which produces
a ‘cap’ on the rate; it is not clear if his Honour was talking about actual or notional needs.
57 [2011] FamCAFC 97; BC201150261.
58 Ibid, at [117].
59 (1993) 16 Fam LR 937; (1993) FLC 92-418.
60 Ibid, at [122]. While it was not central to the case, note the Full Court’s obiter comment on
this matter set out in the text accompanying n 49 above.
34 (2015) 29 Australian Journal of Family Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 39 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Thu Apr 30 10:46:45 2015
/journals/journal/ajfl/vol29pt1/part_1
what is meant by a special circumstance in this context. Further, while it is
trite to say that the purposive approach to interpreting the subsection must be
adopted, little assistance is gained by considering the objects of the child
support legislation.61 The principal object (s 4) speaks of ensuring children
receive a ‘proper’ level of support, with the more particular objects including
that the level of support is determined according to ‘the costs of the children’
and that parents meet that cost according to their relative capacities. Further,
children should ‘share in changes in the standard of living of both parents’
regardless of where they live. These sections are so generally worded they
could be read to support either interpretation.
However, the reason for having a ‘cap’ on child support rates is because the
architects of the legislation considered the research supported the conclusion
that, as income increases, the overall proportion of income spent on raising
children decreases.62 Thus, the Taskforce responsible for the current iteration
of the formula concluded ‘it was reasonable to impose a ceiling on the
maximum level of child costs that any parent could be expected to meet’.63 As
the Federal Magistrate accepted in Seymour, ‘[t]hey are capped because once
a payment gets to an appropriate amount; the child can live a reasonable
lifestyle . . .’.64 The Taskforce noted that as household income increases,
spending becomes discretionary. Further, they recited data indicating support
by parents for the idea of the cap. The Taskforce concluded a cap should
continue to apply concluding:
It follows that there must be mandatory limits on the level of transfers made, based
on a generic formula. A parent may choose to pay more. It should also remain
possible to exceed the cap through the change of assessment process. The . . .
Registrar already has a discretion to assess mandatory child support contributions in
excess of the cap. At present, two reasons for a change of assessment are that:
• It costs extra to cover the children’s special needs
• It costs extra to care for, educate or train the children in the way that the
parents intended
Only a small number of cases are likely to arise on this ground involving raising
the cap.65
There seems little question the taskforce did not countenance the idea that
s 117(2)(c)(ia) could be invoked simply because a parent had a very high
income.
Federal Magistrate Walters’ conclusion in Stirling has an intuitive
attraction; clearly this family was financially out of the ordinary. However, is
that sufficient to give rise to the ‘special circumstance’ required by
s 117(2)(c)(ia)? Many ‘normal’ parents could prove they routinely spend more
on the general support of their children than is allowed for under the formula
(and did so before separation) and/or that due to an income exceeding the cap
the payer parent could afford to pay more than the rate of child support
assessed on their income. But on a proper reading of the section, and as a
61 CSAA s 5.
62 Commonwealth of Australia, above n 18, at [6.1], [8.10] and [9.5.5].
63 Ibid, at [8.10] (emphasis added).
64 [2011] FamCAFC 97; BC201150261 at [40].
65 Commonwealth of Australia, above n 18, at [9.5.5].
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careful reading of Gyselman makes abundantly clear, the reason for spending
more than the formula assessed amount on the children, or for the paying
parent having excess capacity to pay more than the assessed rate, must be a
special circumstance not already factored into the formula assessment,66 that
falls within one of the specified grounds under s 117(2). This is because the
whole premise of the child support formula — as opposed to judicially
determined child support — is that a notional figure is used, with only very
limited scope for departure. To say that the notional figure should not be used
because the parents actually spend (or spent) more or the paying parent can
afford to pay more because of a high income or wealth is hardly a novel or
special argument, or circumstance. This could be the case were the parents’
incomes to be only a little over the combined cap income, or indeed less than
that cap income.
Of course, once another reason is established, the decision-maker must
consider the factors listed in s 117(4) and look at the overall relative financial
circumstances of the parties to arrive at a finding that is fair as between the
parties and the child. At that stage of the inquiry, as indicated above, the case
law is clear that the cap income figure and maximum child support rate
become irrelevant. However, that is a very different thing from finding that the
mere fact of an extremely high income or higher than average level of wealth
establishes s 117(2)(c)(ia).
In addition to the specific issue raised concerning the use of Sheahan above,
this enquiry raises another difficult question more generally about the
application of s 117; what facts can properly amount to a ‘special
circumstance’? The discussion of this issue by Wilson FM in Gabbard &
Gabbard,67 highlights the difficulty of answering this question. His Honour
says ‘[l]ittle useful guidance is found in the decided cases’,68 that the
statements in Gyselman and Savery do not provide any useful guidance69 and
that ss 117(1) and (2) in so far as they refer to special circumstances are
clumsily drafted.70 This uncertainty has been compounded by some judges
misinterpreting the relationship between s 117(2)(c)(ia) — which requires that
the special circumstance relating to income etc, must result in an ‘unjust and
inequitable’ level of child support payable by the liable parent — and s 117(4)
— which lists the relevant considerations when determining, as between the
payer, payee and children, what order, if any, would be ‘just and equitable’.
A plain reading of s 117 leads to the conclusion, as endorsed by the Full
Court in Gyselman, that the factors in s 117(4) (the ‘just and equitable’
enquiry) are only to be considered after it is decided that a threshold special
circumstance exists. As the Full Court has also noted, some of the factors in
s 117(4) overlap with those in s 117(2) and thus a decision-maker may not
need to go slavishly through all of the s 117(4) factors at the second stage,71
66 See, eg, the discussion (2011) FLC 98-056; [2011] FMCAfam 52; BC201100158 at [39] and
[57].
67 [2006] FMCAfam 477; BC200611574 at [41]–[43].
68 Ibid, at [36].
69 Ibid, at [38].
70 Ibid, at [40]. Notably the Full Court in Gyselman referred to ‘the careful way in which s 117
has been structured’: [1991] FamCA 93 at [35].
71 See Hides v Hatton [1997] FamCA 28; (1997) FLC 92-759. See also the Full Court
36 (2015) 29 Australian Journal of Family Law
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because to some extent they may already have been considered under s 117(2).
The Full Court has not said, however, that the s 117(4) factors are relevant to
determining the threshold question of whether there is a special circumstance
— rather, it is the reverse, that some of the factors giving rise to a special
circumstance may also go to what order is just and equitable.72 This approach
makes sense — there is no need to consider the outcome in determining
whether or not a case is special; however, it may well be that, despite the facts
giving rise to a special circumstance under s 117(2), once the further factors
in s 117(4) are considered it is decided that it is not just and equitable as
between the parents and child to make a change to the assessment.73
There are further statements in Gyselman that confirm the very distinct and
separate operation of the first and second (and indeed third) stages of the
departure enquiry. The Full Court said that the financial position of the wife
in that case ‘would become relevant if a ground was established and it was
therefore necessary to turn to subss (4) and (5)’.74 In considering how s 117(4)
operates, their Honours said ‘some of the matters listed in subsection (4) may
overlap with matters already considered under subsection (2)’75 and later they
added:
It is likely that aspects of this will have already been considered, at least in relation
to the non-custodian, under subsection (2). However, the paragraphs are important
because at this stage the legislature is drawing attention to the balancing process
between the claims of the non-custodian for a reduction based on his or her financial
circumstances and those of the custodian.76
Each of the ‘special circumstances’ set out under s 117(2) must result in a
need for a change to be considered; that reason for considering a change varies
depending on the category of special circumstance under s 117(2).
Sub-sections (2)(a) and (aa) require that the special circumstance has the
consequence of significantly reducing the capacity of a parent to provide
financial support for the child, whereas the special circumstance under
sub-section (2)(b) must significantly affect the costs of maintaining the child.
As we have seen, sub-section (2)(c) requires that the special circumstances
relating to the parties’ financial circumstances must result in an ‘unjust or
discussion of this process in Babbitt & Babbitt (2011) 252 FLR 1; 46 Fam LR 77; [2011]
FamCAFC 151; BC201150414 at [153]–[160].
72 Note the contrary position taken by Reithmuller FM in W & W (2005) 34 Fam LR 115;
[2005] FMCAfam 295 at [7] and [19]. This is discussed later in the article.
73 See further the statements at [106], [125] and [139], which confirm the very distinct and
separation operation of the first and second (and indeed third) stages of the departure
enquiry. Indeed, the interrelationship between subss 117(2) and (4) is arguably similar to that
between FLA subss 79(2) and (4) as interpreted in Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108;
293 ALR 70; 47 Fam LR 481; [2012] HCA 52 and Bevan & Bevan (2013) 279 FLR 1; 49
Fam LR 387; [2013] FamCAFC 116; BC201350384. The Full Court was clear that in
relation to those sections the two steps are distinct and must not be conflated and the
determination of what order to make will necessarily involve detailed consideration of
matters that were not germane to the question of whether or not an order should be made at
all.
74 (1991) 15 Fam LR 219; 103 FLR 156; [1992] FLC 92-279 at 79,075-79,076 (emphasis
added).
75 Ibid, at 79,078 (emphasis added).
76 Ibid, at 79,079 (emphasis added).
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inequitable’ level of child support. Thus, it may be that a special circumstance
under s 117(2)(c) does not result in an ‘unjust and inequitable’ level of child
support being paid overall according to the formula;77 if it does not, then the
enquiry does not proceed to the more expansive consideration required under
s 117(4) when determining what change, if any, is appropriate. The point is,
the process required under s 117 does not invite the decision maker to start by
considering the individual circumstances of the case under s 117(4) and decide
whether they think something other than the formula rate would be fair; rather
it requires first a threshold finding that a special circumstance as enumerated
in s 117(2) results in some unfairness. Indeed, if s 117(4) could be considered
at the outset, the grounds in s 117(2) would be redundant. Thus, a special
circumstance does not arise because, in the normal (ie not special)
circumstances of a case, a decision maker thinks the assessment is unfair by
reference to the matters set out in s 117(4).
However, there has been judicial confusion as to this relationship between
subss 117(2) and (4), perhaps arising out of the ambiguity of the meaning of
‘special circumstances’. The view was expressed in W & W78 that ‘special
circumstances’ is an ‘open ended . . . concept’.79 However, the two cases80
used by the judicial officer to justify this interpretation are questionable
authorities for this proposition. These two decisions by the same judge provide
nothing in their reasoning to support an interpretation of ‘special
circumstances’ as ‘open ended’; indeed, given their peculiar facts and the issue
addressed in each, they do not provide any illuminative legal precedent as to
the meaning or application of the term ‘special circumstances’.
The Federal Magistrate in W & W set out the relevant passages of Gyselman
as to the meaning of ‘special circumstances’, then referred to Sheahan.81 As
discussed above, this is a child maintenance case and arguably not relevant to
the interpretation of s 117(2). Further, the following interpretation of ‘special
circumstances’ by the Federal Magistrate in W & W conflates subss 117(2) and
(4):
The statement of the ground, as it actually appears in s 117(2)(c)(i) [now
s 117(2)(c)(ia)], must be read bearing in mind that the words ‘unjust and inequitable’
have themselves a lengthy definition provided for in s 117(4) through to s 117(9).82
Reinforcing this erroneous interpretation of the operation of these sections,
the Federal Magistrate then criticised the objections officer in W & W for not
taking into account the matters set out in s 117(4) when considering whether
a ground for departure was established under s 117(2).83 Having concluded the
objection decision was flawed, his Honour then reconsidered the matter. In
doing so, his Honour discussed how the formula as applied in this case
77 An example might be where the assessed child support looks unjust and inequitable based
on a parent’s income when one small point in time is considered, however, when looked at
over a longer period, it does not look unjust.
78 (2005) 34 Fam LR 115; [2005] FMCAfam 295.
79 W & W (2005) 34 Fam LR 115; [2005] FMCAfam 295 at [8].
80 Portillo & Portillo (1994) FLC 92-484; 17 Fam LR 777; 117 FLR 210 and S v C (1997) FLC
92-750.
81 (1993) FLC 92-375; 16 Fam LR 437; 113 FLR 429.
82 (2005) 34 Fam LR 115; [2005] FMCAfam 295 at [14].
83 Ibid, at [21].
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resulted in unfairness, concluding by saying that s 117(2) provides the solution
to this. The nub of his Honour’s decision was that this case was unusual
because the payer’s wife had a higher than normal capacity to contribute
financially to the support of their dependent children and the payer could share
expenses with her (something patently not intended to be included in the
formula assessment of child support and not covered by any of the grounds for
departure under s 117(2)). His Honour said that careful formula analysis
alone, while useful, is not sufficient for the purposes of s 117(2), concluding
that to determine if a special circumstance exists, one must look to
subss 117(4)–(9).84 With respect, this approach does not reflect the terms of
the section, is not permitted under Gyselman and makes redundant s 117(2).
His Honour basically says that, even though no matter under s 117(2) had
presented itself, and the formula was operating precisely as it was intended to,
in his view the formula did not operate fairly in this case, and that this was
therefore a ‘special circumstance’.
Further, the Federal Magistrate criticised the objections officer’s conclusion
that ‘just because a parent may appear to have additional capacity to pay child
support does not mean it should be automatically directed to child support.
There must be a reason established for doing so.’85 His Honour responded:
There was never any dispute in this case that the child has financial needs far greater
than the assessment amount, which were not able to be met by the applicant
[mother]. As a matter of fundamental principle, child support (and maintenance) is
based upon the needs of the child and the capacity of the parents to meet that need
. . . The needs of the child and the ability to meet those needs lie at the hear [sic] of
a ‘special circumstance under [s 117(2)(c)(ia)] . . . The only real issue in this case
was the capacity of the respondent [father] to assist in meeting the child’s financial
needs.
Whatever ethos might underpin the child support scheme, the clear words of
the statute cannot be ignored and s 117(2)(c)(ia) is not framed in the terms
suggested by his Honour; it is clearly not a question of the needs of the child.
The needs of the child can only be considered in limited circumstances under
other parts of s 117(2).
This is not the only case evidencing judicial confusion as to what amounts
to a ‘special circumstance’ and the width of s 117(2). In Seigel & Danner,86
Warnick J upheld an appeal partly on the basis that the Federal Magistrate had
based his conclusion as to the existence of a ground for departure on the fact
that one of the parties lived outside of Australia. Warnick J, however, was
clear that ‘for “the special circumstances” to found a departure from an
assessment, they must have a relationship to the ground for departure’.87
Confusion as to the proper application of s 117(2), and particularly the
relationship between subss 117(2) and (4), is significant in cases of extreme
income/wealth, because clearly under subs 117(4) that income/wealth is a very
relevant factor. The question remains, however, as to its relevance under
subs 117(2)(c)(ia), where the parent is already paying the maximum rate of
84 Ibid, at [32]–[33].
85 Ibid.
86 [2009] FamCAFC 100; BC200950311.
87 Ibid, at [46].
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support. Child support legislation is not intended to effect redistributions of
wealth; the formula assesses capacity to pay support based on income in the
first instance and once a parent shows a capacity to pay the maximum level of
support based on the prescribed maximum combined income, it is arguably
irrelevant (in terms of establishing a ground for departure under s 117(2)) to
show they have assets or income that further increase their capacity to pay —
as discussed above this is the whole point of the cap. There is also an obvious
link between income and assets; high income earners often accumulate
considerable assets, and assets in turn have the potential to generate income.
Thus, when setting the cap it was arguably envisaged that many high income
earners would have significant assets, and this of itself should not be enough
to establish a special reason. Once a parent is paying the maximum assessable
rate of child support, without some other special circumstance (such as special
needs of the child or high education costs) child support should not increase
simply because the parent has a very high income and can afford to pay more.
It is hard to see how that was not the clear intention of the cap in the formula.
Indeed, the Full Court has said that the mere fact that a parent’s income has
decreased below the amount used in the assessment is not sufficient, per se, to
establish this same ground for departure.88 The words of subs 117(2)(c)(ia) are
deliberately broad to ensure that a wide range of unfair circumstances relating
to the parties’ financial situations can be captured by this provision (for
example, changes in employment, receipt of untaxed income, the interposition
of entities to divert income out of the hands of the parent etc) but it is difficult
to see how high income or mega wealth alone amounts to an unfair
circumstance where the legislature has decided to impose a cap on the
maximum assessed rate of child support. Indeed, it was precisely to stop child
support increasing based solely on higher incomes that the cap was
introduced. Thus, the approach adopted in Seymour is to be preferred.
Moreover, a position that permits high income or wealth alone to justify a
departure raises some very difficult questions (very similar to those seen in the
now rejected ‘special contributions’ approach used in ‘big money’ property
settlement cases).89 Most obviously, at what point is the wealth/income
threshold crossed to make the case special? A great many parents have
combined incomes over the cap. Precisely how is a decision-maker to
determine when this extra income/wealth amounts to a ‘special circumstance’
given the legislative intent was not to have child support increase simply
based on very high payer income or because some people have more assets
than others. This approach undermines the essential premise that, absent
specified special circumstances, child support is calculated by reference to a
statutory formula based on income, and not by reference to the particular
financial circumstances of an individual family.
Further, and very importantly, allowing a departure based solely on high
income/wealth treats rich families differently without a sound basis for doing
so. If mega-wealth/high income alone can amount to a special circumstance,
88 Ross v McDermott [1998] FamCA 134; (1998) FLC 93-003, (1998) 23 Fam LR 613 at [30].
89 See Hoffman v Hoffman (2014) 51 Fam LR 568; [2014] FamCAFC 92; BC201451244;
Fields & Smith [2015] FamCAFC 57 and L Young, ‘Sissinghurst, Sackville-West and
“Special Skill”’ (1997) 11(3)AJFL 268.
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why could a parent not show that their circumstances were special because
they could not afford the normal rate of child support due to their very low
income (assuming there was nothing special about their expenses)? As CS
policy documents suggest,90 this argument is unlikely to be successful
notwithstanding this would seem more of a special circumstance than in
Stirling v Dobson, where the children would suffer no hardship regardless of
the outcome. Stirling v Dobson is a decision which arguably says the same
rules for child support do not apply to extremely wealthy families, despite the
provision of a cap rate. While the ultra-poor and their children may be bound
by the notional costs of children built into the formula, and have to cut their
cloth to fit their circumstances, the children of the mega-rich are not
necessarily so bound.
One can sympathise with an approach that permits reconsideration of the
amount of child support payable by extremely high earners — otherwise many
mega-wealthy payers of child support will essentially be free to determine the
extent to which they wish to elevate the child’s standard of living when not
with them (absent any other ground that gets them over the line, such as
private school costs as in Stirling). But the attractiveness of this approach is
not sufficient; it must be permissible under the legislation and arguably, when
the legislation is read as a whole in light of its intended operation and the
superior case law considered, it is not.
Conclusion
It has been argued here that the approach in Seymour is to be preferred,
namely, that subs 117(2)(c)(ia) should be interpreted not to permit a ground
for departure to be established solely based on a parent’s very high income or
extreme wealth where the maximum child support rate is already being paid.
There is a significant point of law at issue in terms of the interpretation of
s 117(2) but the differing judicial approaches to this issue indicate confusion
on this point as well as more broadly on the interpretation of ‘special
circumstances’ and particularly the interrelationship between subss 117(2) and
(4). Given how few cases go to court, these matters are not likely to be
considered by a superior court any time soon. While not binding on
decision-makers, it would be useful if, at the very least, the policy document
(the Guide) used by CS91 addressed this question directly, as most
decision-making in this area is done internally by CS decision-makers.
Obviously, the same cannot be said if the formula assessed child support is
not at the maximum rate. There may well be cases where a parent is assessed
to pay something less as a result, for example, of the way their business is
structured. Thus, the parent’s taxable income may not reflect their true income.
But in such a case the ground would not be established because of the extreme
90 <http://guides.dss.gov.au/child-support-guide/2/6/13> (accessed 27 March 2015). However,
see EGH & SH [2005] FMCAfam 27; BC200500563 where a payee established a ground
based on the inability to meet her normal expenses on her low income; however, it was also
established that the husband’s actual income was double his assessable income of about
$25,000.
91 See <http://www.humanservices.gov.au/corporate/publications-and-resources/child-support-
guide/> (accessed 7 January 2015).
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income/wealth but rather because the assessment did not reflect the parent’s
true income. If there were no other factor relevant, it would be open to a
decision maker in those circumstances to decide the correct outcome was to
set the parent’s income – doing so would allow the cap to operate. Of course,
the decision maker would not be obliged to adopt that approach, though it is
appropriate for decision makers to consider how the formula assessment
would operate in such a case.92
It might be suggested that the issues raised in this paper raise more
fundamental questions about the formula. Is a cap appropriate? Should s 117
accommodate more cases where actual expenditure on a child makes the
formula assessment unfair (that is, beyond that contemplated by the other
grounds for a departure)? It seems extremely unlikely, however, there would
be any political will to reconsider these questions, as the only way to address
them short of removing the cap – which seems a remote possibility to say the
least - would be to permit more departure from the formula and effectively
more individualised assessment of child support, which is expensive and a
return to the past. In fact, the most recent statements from the federal
government on child support are to the effect that the last round of reforms
have made the system too complicated.93 While child support reform is again
on the Federal Government’s agenda,94 it seems unlikely issues such as these
will be addressed. Thus, we shall have to wait until the Full Court is called on
to consider these issues in more detail.
92 See the cases above n 20.
93 See the reported complaints of National Federal Member of Parliament George Christensen,
who will chair the Social Affairs and Legal Policy Committee: L Constable, ‘Christensen
takes key role in social policy, legal affairs’, Daily Mercury, 11 November 2013,
<http://www.dailymercury.com.au/news/christensen-takes-key-role-social-policy-legal-
aff/2080075/> (accessed 6 January 2015).
94 See <http://www.aph.gov.au/childsupport> (accessed 17 March 2015) for details of the
Federal Government’s most recent enquiry into child support.
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